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Abstract
We initiate the analysis of the response of computer owners to various offers of
defence systems against a cyber-hacker (for instance, a botnet attack), as a stochas-
tic game of a large number of interacting agents. We introduce a simple mean-field
game that models their behavior. It takes into account both the random process of
the propagation of the infection (controlled by the botner herder) and the decision
making process of customers. Its stationary version turns out to be exactly solvable
(but not at all trivial) under an additional natural assumption that the execution
time of the decisions of the customers (say, switch on or out the defence system) is
much faster that the infection rates.
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1 Introduction
A botnet, or zombie network, is a network of computers infected with a malicious program
that allows cybercriminals to control the infected machine remotely without the user’s
knowledge. Botnets have become a source of income for entire groups of cybercriminals
since the cost of running botnets is cheap and the risk of getting caught is relatively small
due to the fact that other people’s assets are used to launch attacks. The interactive
process of the attackers and defenders can be modeled as a Game. The use of game theory
in modeling attacker-defender has been extensively adopted in the computer security
domain recently; see [5], [22] and [24] and bibliography there for more details. Two
aspects are important. The first one is the contamination effect. The second one is the
large number of computers. So, in fact, one deals with a stochastic game of a large
number of interacting agents. This is amenable to Mean Field theory. To investigate
this approach represents the main objective of this paper. Our model takes into account
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both the random process of the propagation of the infection (controlled by the botnet
herder) and the decision making process of customers. We develop a stationary version
which turns out to be exactly solvable (but not at all trivial) under an additional natural
assumption that the execution time of the decisions of the customers (say, switch on or
out the defense system) is much faster that the infection rates.
Similar models can be applied to the analysis of defense against a biological weapon,
for instance by adding the active agent (principal interested in spreading the disease),
into the general mean-field epidemic model of [23] that extends the well established SIS
(susceptible-infectious-susceptible) and SIR (susceptible-infectious-recovered) models.
Mean-field games present a quickly developing area of the game theory. It was initiated
by Lasry-Lions [21] and Huang-Malhame-Caines [14], [15], see [1], [4], [13], [12], [6] for
recent surveys, as well as [8], [7], [9], [2], [20], [25], [3] and references therein. The papers
[10] and [11] initiated the study of finite-state space mean-field games that are the objects
of our analysis here.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce our model, formu-
late the basic mean-field game (MFG) consistency problem in its dynamic and stationary
versions leading to precise formulation of our main problem of characterizing the stable
solutions (equilibria) of the stationary problem. This problem is a consistency problem
between an HJB equation for a stochastic control of individual players and a fixed point
problem for an evolutionary dynamics. These two preliminary problems are fully ana-
lyzed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 is devoted to the final synthesis of the
stationary MFG problem from the solutions to these two preliminary problems. In par-
ticular, the phase transitions and the bifurcation points changing the number of solutions
are explicitly found. In the last section further perspectives are discussed.
2 The model
Assume that any computer can be in 4 states: DI,DS, UI, US, where the first letter, D
or U , refers to the state of a defended (by some system, which effectiveness we are trying
to analyze) or an unprotected computer, and the second letter, S and I, to susceptible
or infected state. The change between D and U is subject to the decisions of computer
owners (though the precise time of the execution of her intent is noisy) and the changes
between S and I are random with distributions depending on the level of efforts vH of
the Herder and the state D or U of the computer.
Let nDI , nDS, nUI , nUS denote the numbers of computers in the corresponding states
with N = nDS + nDI + nUI + nUS the total number of computers. By a state of the
system we shall mean either the 4-vector n = (nDI , nDS, nUI , nUS) or its normalized
version x = (xDI , xDS, xUI , xUS) = n/N . The fraction of defended computers xDI + xDS
represents the analogue of the control parameter vD from [5], the level of defense of the
system, though here it results as a compound effect of individual decisions of all players.
The control parameter u of each player may have two values, 0 and 1, meaning that
the player is happy with the level of defense (D or I) or she prefers to switch one to
another. When the updating decision 1 is made, the updating effectively occurs after
some exponential time with the parameter λ (measuring the speed of the response of the
defense system). The limit λ→∞ corresponds to the immediate execution.
The recovery rates (the rates of change from I to S) are given constants qDrec and q
U
rec
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for defended and unprotected computers respectively, and the rates of infection from the
direct attacks are vHq
D
inf and vHq
U
inf respectively with constants q
D
inf and q
U
inf . The rates of
infection spreading from infected to susceptible computers are βUU/N, βUD/N, βDU/N, βDD/N ,
with numbers βUU , βUD, βDU , βDD, where the first (resp second) letter in the index refers
to the state of the infected (resp. susceptible) computer (the scaling 1/N is necessary to
make the rates of unilateral changes and binary interactions comparable in the N → ∞
limit).
Thus if all computers use the strategy uDS, uDI , uUS, uUI , u ∈ {0, 1} and the level of
attack is vH , the evolution of the frequencies x in the limit N →∞ can be described by
the following system of ODE:


x˙DI = xDSq
D
infvH − xDIq
D
rec + xDIxDSβDD + xUIxDSβUD + λ(xUIuUI − xDIuDI),
x˙DS = −xDSq
D
infvH + xDIq
D
rec − xDIxDSβDD − xUIxDSβUD + λ(xUSuUS − xDSuDS),
x˙UI = xUSq
U
infvH − xUIq
U
rec + xDIxUSβDU + xUIxUSβUU − λ(xUIuUI − xDIuDI),
x˙US = −xUSq
U
infvH + xUIq
U
rec − xDIxUSβDU − xUIxUSβUU − λ(xUSuUS − xDSuDS).
(1)
Remark 1. If all βUD, βUU , βDU , βUU are equal to some β, q
D
inf = q
U
inf = q
inf and qDrec =
qDrec = vD, where vD is interpreted as the defender group’s combined defense effort, then
summing up the first and the third equations in (1) leads to the equation
x˙ = qinfvH(1− x) + βx(1− x)− vDx, (2)
for the total fraction of infected computers x = xDI +xUI . This equation coincides (up to
some constants) with equation (2) from [5], which is the starting point of the analysis of
paper [5].
It is instructive to see, how evolution (1) can be deduced rigorously as the limit of the
Markov processes specifying the random dynamics of N players. The generator of this
Markov evolution on the states n is (where the unchanged values in the arguments of F
on the r.h.s are omitted)
LNF (nDI , nDS, nUI , nUS) = nDSq
D
infvHF (nDS−1, nDI+1)+nUSq
U
infvHF (nUS−1, nUI+1)
+nDIq
D
recF (nDI − 1, nDS + 1) + nUIq
U
recF (nUI − 1, nUS + 1)
+nDInDSβDDF (nDS − 1, nDI + 1)/N + nDInUSβDUF (nUS − 1, nUI + 1)/N
+nUInDSβUDF (nDS − 1, nDI + 1)/N + nUInUSβUUF (nUS − 1, nUI + 1)/N
+λnDSuDSF (nDS − 1, nUS + 1) + λnUSuUSF (nUS − 1, nDS + 1)
+λnDIuDIF (nDI − 1, nUI + 1) + λnUIuUIF (nUI − 1, nDI + 1),
or in terms of x as
LNF (xDI , xDS, xUI , xUS) = NxDSq
D
infvHF (x−eDS/N+eDI/N)+NxUSq
U
infvHF ((x−eUS/N+eUI/N)
+NxDIq
D
recF (x− eDI/N + eDS/N) +NxUIq
U
recF (x− eUI/N + eUS/N)
+NxDIxDSβDDF (x− eDS/N + eDI/N) +NxDIxUSβDUF (x− eUS/N + eUI/N)
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+NxUIxDSβUDF (x− eDS/N + eDI/N) +NxUIxUSβUUF (x− eUS/N + eUI/N)
+NλxDSuDSF (x− eDS/N + eUS/N) +NλxUSuUSF (x− eUS/N + eDS/N)
+NλxDIuDIF (x− eDI/N + eUI/N) +NλxUIuUIF (x− eUI/N + eDI/N), (3)
where {ej} is the standard basis in R
4.
If F is a differentiable function, the generator LN turns to the generator
LF (xDI , xDS, xUI , xUS) = xDSq
D
infvH
(
∂F
∂xDI
−
∂F
∂xDS
)
+ xUSq
U
infvH
(
∂F
∂xUI
−
∂F
∂xUS
)
+xDIq
D
rec
(
∂F
∂xDS
−
∂F
∂xDI
)
+ xUIq
U
rec
(
∂F
∂xUS
−
∂F
∂xUI
)
+xDIxDSβDD
(
∂F
∂xDI
−
∂F
∂xDS
)
+ xDIxUSβDU
(
∂F
∂xUI
−
∂F
∂xUS
)
+xUIxDSβUD
(
∂F
∂xDI
−
∂F
∂xDS
)
+ xUIxUSβUU
(
∂F
∂xUI
−
∂F
∂xUS
)
+λxDSuDS
(
∂F
∂xUS
−
∂F
∂xDS
)
+ λxUSuUS
(
∂F
∂xDS
−
∂F
∂xUS
)
+ λxDIuDI
(
∂F
∂xUI
−
∂F
∂xDI
)
+ λxUIuUI
(
∂F
∂xDI
−
∂F
∂xUI
)
(4)
in the limit N →∞. This is a first order partial differential operator. Its characteristics
are given precisely by the ODE (1). A rigorous derivation showing the solutions to (1)
describe the limit of the Markov chain generated by (3) can be found e.g. in [17].
We shall now use the Markov model above to assess the actions of individual players.
If x(t) and vH(t) are given, the dynamics of each individual player is the Markov chain
on 4 states with the generator
Lindg(DI) = λuind(DI)(g(UI)− g(DI)) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)),
Lindg(DS) = λuind(DS)(g(US)− g(DS)) + qDinfvH(g(DI)− g(DS))
+ xDIβDD(g(DI)− g(DS)) + xUIβUD(g(DI)− g(DS)),
Lindg(UI) = λuind(UI)(g(DI)− g(UI)) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)),
Lindg(US) = λuind(US)(g(DS)− g(US)) + qUinfvH(g(UI)− g(US))
+ xDIβDU(g(UI)− g(US)) + xUIβUU(g(UI)− g(US))
(5)
depending on the individual control uind.
Assuming that an individual pays a fee kD per unit of time for the defense system and
kI per unit time for losses resulting from being infected, her cost during a period of time
T , that she tries to minimize, is ∫ T
0
(kD1D + kI1I) ds, (6)
where 1D (resp. 1I) is the indicator function of the states DI,DS (resp. of the states DI,
UI). Assuming that the Herder has to pay kHvH per unit of time using efforts vH and
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receive the income f(x) depending on the distribution x of the states of the computers,
her payoff, that she tries to maximize, is∫ T
0
(fH(x)− kHvH) ds. (7)
Therefore, starting with some control
ucom = (ucomt (DI), u
com
t (DS), u
com
t (UI), u
com
t (US))
the Herder can find his optimal strategy vH(t) solving the deterministic optimal control
problem with dynamics (1) and payoff (7) finding both optimal vH and the trajectory
x(t). Once x(t) and vH(t) are known, each individual should solve the Markov control
problem (5) with costs (6) thus finding the individual optimal strategy
uindt = (u
ind
t (DI), u
ind
t (DS), u
ind
t (UI), u
ind
t (US)).
The basic MFG consistency equation can now be explicitly written as
uindt = u
com
t .
Instead of analyzing this rather complicated dynamic problem, we shall look for a
simpler problem of consistent stationary strategies.
There are two standard stationary problems naturally linked with a dynamic one, one
being the search for the average payoff
g = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
(kD1D + kI1I) dt
for long period game, and another the search for discounted optimal payoff. The first is
governed by the solutions of HJB of the form (T − t)µ+ g, linear in t (then µ describing
the optimal average payoff), so that g satisfies the stationary HJB equation:

λmin
u
u(g(UI)− g(DI)) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
λmin
u
u(g(US)− g(DS)) + qDinfvH(g(DI)− g(DS))
+ xDIβDD(g(DI)− g(DS)) + xUIβUD(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
λmin
u
u(g(DI)− g(UI)) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
λmin
u
u(g(DS)− g(US)) + qUinfvH(g(UI)− g(US))
+ xDIβDU(g(UI)− g(US)) + xUIβUU(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ
(8)
where min is over two values {0, 1}. We shall denote u = (uDI , uUI , uDS, uUS) the argmax
in this solution.
The discounted optimal payoff (with the discounting coefficient δ) satisfies the sta-
tionary HJB
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

λmin
u
u(g(UI)− g(DI) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = δg(DI),
λmin
u
u(g(US)− g(DS)) + qDinfvH(g(DI)− g(DS))
+ xDIβDD(g(DI)− g(DS)) + xUIβUD(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = δg(DS),
λmin
u
u(g(DI)− g(UI)) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = δg(UI),
λmin
u
u(g(DS)− g(US)) + qUinfvH(g(UI)− g(US))
+ xDIβDU(g(UI)− g(US)) + xUIβUU(g(UI)− g(US)) = δg(US)
(9)
The analysis of these two settings is mostly analogous. We shall concentrate on the
first one. Introducing the coefficients
α = qDinfvH + xDIβDD + xUIβUD,
β = qUinfvH + xDIβDU + xUIβUU ,
(10)
the stationary HJB equation (8) rewrites as

λmin(g(UI)− g(DI), 0) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
λmin(g(US)− g(DS), 0) + α(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
λmin(g(DI)− g(UI), 0) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
λmin(g(DS)− g(US), 0) + β(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ,
(11)
where the choice of the first term as the infimum in these equations corresponds to the
choice of control u = 1.
The stationary MFG consistency problem is in finding x = (xDI , xDS, xUI , xUS) and
u = (uDI , uDS, uUI , uUS), where x is the stationary point of evolution (1), that is

xDSα− xDIq
D
rec + λ(xUIuUI − xDIuDI) = 0
− xDSα + xDIq
D
rec + λ(xUSuUS − xDSuDS) = 0
xUSβ − xUIq
U
rec − λ(xUIuUI − xDIuDI) = 0
− xUSβ + xUIq
U
rec − λ(xUSuUS − xDSuDS) = 0,
(12)
with u = (uDI , uDS, uUI , uUS) giving minimum in the solution to (8) or (11). Thus x is a
fixed point of the limiting dynamics of the distribution of large number of agents such that
the corresponding stationary control is individually optimal subject to this distribution.
Yet in other words, x = (xDI , xDS, xUI , xUS) and u = (uDI , uDS, uUI , uUS) solve (8), (12)
simultaneously.
Fixed points can practically model a stationary behavior only if they are stable. Thus
we are interested in stable solutions (x, u) to the stationary MFG consistency problem
(12),(8), where a solution is stable if the corresponding stationary distribution x is a
stable equilibrium to (1) (with u fixed by this solution).
Apart from stability, the fixed points can be classified via its efficiency. Namely, let
us say that a solution to the stationary MFG is efficient (or globally optimal) if the
corresponding average cost µ is minimal among all other solutions.
Talking about strategies, let us reduce the discussion to non-degenerate situations,
where the minima in (11) are achieved on a single value of u only. In principle, there are
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16 possible pure stationary strategies (functions from the state space to {0, 1}). But not
all of them can be realized as solutions to (11). In fact if uDI = 1, then g(UI) < g(DI)
(can be equal in degenerate case) and thus uUI = 0. This argument forbids all but four
strategies as possible solutions to (11), namely

(i) g(UI) ≤ g(DI), g(US) ≤ g(DS)⇐⇒ uUI = uUS = 0, uDI = uDS = 1,
(ii) g(UI) ≥ g(DI), g(US) ≥ g(DS)⇐⇒ uDI = uDS = 0, uUI = uUS = 1,
(iii) g(UI) ≤ g(DI), g(US) ≥ g(DS)⇐⇒ uUI = uDS = 0, uDI = uUS = 1,
(iv) g(UI) ≥ g(DI), g(US) ≤ g(DS)⇐⇒ uDI = uUS = 0, uUI = uDS = 1.
(13)
The first two strategies, either always choose U or always choose D, are acyclic, that
is the corresponding Markov processes are acyclic in the sense that there does not exist a
cycle in a motion subject to these strategies. Other two strategies choose between U and
D differently if infected or not.
Of course, allowing degenerate strategies, more possibilities arise.
To complete the model, let us observe that the natural assumptions on the parameters
of the model arising directly from their interpretation are as follows:

qDrec ≥ q
U
rec, q
D
inf < q
U
inf ,
βUD ≤ βUU , βDD ≤ βDU ,
kD ≤ kI .
(14)
We shall always assume (14) hold. Two additional natural simplifying assumptions
that we shall use sometimes are the following: the infection rate does not depend on the
level of defense of the computer transferring the infection, but only on the level of defence
of the susceptible computer, that is, instead of four coefficients β one has only 2 of them
βU = βDU = βUU , βD = βUD = βDD, (15)
and the recovery rate do not depend on whether a computer is protected against the
infection or not:
qrec = q
D
rec = q
U
rec. (16)
As we shall see, a convenient assumption, which is weaker than (16), turns out to be
qDrec − q
U
rec < (q
U
inf − q
D
inf)vH . (17)
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that customers can switch rather quickly their
regime of defence (once they are willing to) meaning that we are effectively interested in
the asymptotic regime of large λ. As we shall show, in this regime the stationary MFG
problem above can be completely solved analytically. In this sense the present model is
more complicated than a related mean-field game model of corruption with three basic
states developed in [19], where a transparent analytic classification of stable solutions is
available already for arbitrary finite λ.
3 Analysis of the stationary HJB equation
Let us start by solving HJB equation (11).
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Consider strategy (i) of (13), so that being unprotected is always optimal. Then (11)
becomes 

λ(g(UI)− g(DI)) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
λ(g(US)− g(DS)) + α(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
β(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ.
(18)
As the solution g is defined up to an additive constant we can set g(US) = 0. Then (18)
becomes 

λ(g(UI)− g(DI)) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
− λg(DS) + α(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
− qUrecg(UI) + kI = µ,
βg(UI) = µ.
(19)
From the third and fourth equations we find
g(UI) =
kI
β + qUrec
, µ = βg(UI) =
βkI
β + qUrec
. (20)
Substituting these values in the first and second equations we obtain

g(DS) =
kD − µ
λ
+ kI
α(β + λ+ qUrec)
λ(β + qUrec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
,
g(DI) =
kD − µ
λ
+ kI
(α + λ)(β + λ+ qUrec)
λ(β + qUrec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
,
(21)
and the conditions g(UI) ≤ g(DI), g(US) = 0 ≤ g(DS) become
kD(β + q
U
rec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec) ≥ kI [(β + λ)q
D
rec − (α + λ)q
U
rec],
kD(β + q
U
rec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec) ≥ kI [β(λ+ q
D
rec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)]
(22)
respectively.
Consider strategy (ii) of (13), so that being defended is optimal. Then (11) becomes

qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
α(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
λ(g(DI)− g(UI)) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
λ(g(DS)− g(US)) + β(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ.
(23)
Setting g(DS) = 0 yields

− qDrecg(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
αg(DI) + kD = µ,
λ(g(DI)− g(UI)) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
− λg(US)) + β(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ.
(24)
From the first and second equations we find
g(DI) =
kI
α + qDrec
, µ = kD + αg(DI) =
α(kD + kI) + kDq
D
rec
α + qDrec
. (25)
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Substituting these values in the third and fourth equations we obtain

g(US) = −
kD
λ
+ kI
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
λ(α + qDrec)(β + λ+ q
U
rec)
,
g(UI) = −
kD
λ
+ kI
(β + λ)(λ+ qDrec)− αq
U
rec
λ(α + qDrec)(β + λ+ q
U
rec)
.
(26)
and the conditions g(UI) ≥ g(DI), g(US) ≥ g(DS) = 0 turn to
kD(α + q
D
rec)(β + λ+ q
U
rec) ≤ kI [(β + λ)q
D
rec − (α + λ)q
U
rec],
kD(α + q
D
rec)(β + λ+ q
U
rec) ≤ kI [β(λ+ q
D
rec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)]
(27)
respectively.
Consider strategy (iii) of (13). Then (11) becomes

λ(g(UI)− g(DI)) + qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
α(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
λ(g(DS)− g(US)) + β(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ.
(28)
Setting g(DS) = 0 yields
µ = αg(DI) + kD
from the second equation, then
λg(UI) = g(DI)(α+ λ+ qDrec)− kI
from the first equation and
g(US) =
g(DI)
λqUrec
[αλ+ qUrec(α + λ+ q
D
rec)] +
λkD − (λ+ q
U
rec)kI
λqUrec
from the third one. Plugging these expressions in the fourth equation of (28) we find
(after many cancelations) g(DI) and then the other values of g:

g(DI) =
(β + λ+ qUrec)(kI − kD)
α(β + λ+ qUrec) + q
U
rec(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
,
g(US) =
1
λ
kI [β(λ+ q
D
rec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)]− kD(β + q
U
rec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
α(β + λ + qUrec) + q
U
rec(α+ λ+ q
D
rec)
,
g(UI) =
1
λ
kI [(λ+ q
D
rec)(λ+ β)− αq
U
rec]− kD(β + λ+ q
U
rec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
α(β + λ+ qUrec) + q
U
rec(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
(29)
Hence
µ =
kIα(β + λ+ q
U
rec) + kDq
U
rec(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
α(β + λ+ qUrec) + q
U
rec(α+ λ+ q
D
rec)
.
The conditions g(UI) ≤ g(DI), g(US) ≥ g(DS) rewrite as{
kD(α+ q
D
rec)(β + λ+ q
U
rec) ≥ kI [(β + λ)q
D
rec − (α + λ)q
U
rec],
kD(α+ λ+ q
D
rec)(β + q
U
rec) ≤ kI [β(λ+ q
D
rec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)].
(30)
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Consider strategy (iv) of (13). Then (11) becomes

qDrec(g(DS)− g(DI)) + kI + kD = µ,
λ(g(US)− g(DS)) + α(g(DI)− g(DS)) + kD = µ,
λ(g(DI)− g(UI)) + qUrec(g(US)− g(UI)) + kI = µ,
β(g(UI)− g(US)) = µ.
(31)
Setting g(US) = 0 yields µ = βg(UI) from the fourth equation, then
λg(DI) = g(UI)(β + λ+ qUrec)− kI
from the third equation and
λqDrecg(DS) = g(UI)[βλ+ q
D
rec(β + λ+ q
U
rec)]− kDλ− kI(λ+ q
D
rec)
from the first one. Plugging these expressions in the second equation of (31) we find
g(UI) and then the other values of g:

g(UI) =
(kD + kI)(α + λ+ q
D
rec)
β(α+ λ+ qDrec) + q
D
rec(β + λ+ q
U
rec)
,
g(DS) =
1
λ
kD(β + λ+ q
U
rec)(α + q
D
rec) + kI [α(λ+ q
U
rec)− β(λ+ q
D
rec)]
β(α+ λ + qDrec) + q
D
rec(β + λ+ q
U
rec)
,
g(DI) =
1
λ
kD(β + λ+ q
U
rec)(α + λ+ q
D
rec) + kI [(α+ λ)(λ+ q
U
rec)− βq
D
rec]
β(α+ λ+ qDrec) + q
D
rec(β + λ+ q
U
rec)
.
(32)
Hence the conditions g(UI) ≥ g(DI), g(DS) ≥ g(US) = 0 rewrite as{
kD(α+ λ+ q
D
rec)(β + q
U
rec) ≤ kI [(β + λ)q
D
rec − (α + λ)q
U
rec],
kD(α+ q
D
rec)(β + λ+ q
U
rec) ≥ kI [β(λ+ q
D
rec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)].
(33)
We are now interested in finding out how many solutions equation (11) may have for
a given x. The first observation in this direction is that the interior of the domain defined
by (22) (that is, with a solution of case (i)) and the interior of the domain defined by
(30) (that is, with a solution of case (iii)) do not intersect, because the first inequality in
(22) contradicts the second inequality in (30) (apart from the boundary). Similarly, the
interior of the domain defined by (22) (that is with a solution of case (i)) and the interior
of the domain defined by (33) (that is, with a solution of case (iv)) do not intersect, and
the interior of the domain defined by (27) (that is, with a solution of case (ii)) does not
intersect with the domains having solutions in cases (iii) or (iv).
Next we find that one can distinguish two natural domains of x classifying the solutions
to HJB equation (11):
D1 = {x : β + q
U
rec > α + q
D
rec}, D2 = {x : β + q
U
rec < α + q
D
rec}.
More explicitly,
D1 = {x : xDI(βDU − βDD) + xUI(βUU − βUD) > (q
D
inf − q
U
inf)vH + q
D
rec − q
U
rec}.
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By (14) it is seen that under a natural additional simplifying assumptions (16) or even
(17), all positive x belong to D1 (or its boundary), so that D2 is empty.
Under additional assumption (15) the condition x ∈ D1 gets a simpler form
x > x¯ =
(qDinf − q
U
inf)vH + q
D
rec − q
U
rec
βU − βD
. (34)
To link with the conditions for cases (i)-(iv) one observes the following equivalent
forms of the main condition of being in D1:
β + qUrec > α + q
D
rec ⇐⇒ (β + q
U
rec)(α+ q
D
rec + λ) > (α + q
D
rec)(β + q
U
rec + λ)
⇐⇒ β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec) > (β + λ)q
D
rec − (α + λ)q
U
rec. (35)
From here it is seen that if x belongs simultaneously to the interiors of the domains
specified by (22) and (27) (that is, with solutions in cases (i) and (ii) simultaneously),
then necessarily x ∈ D1 (that is, for x ∈ D2 the conditions specifying cases (i) and (ii)
are incompatible). On the other hand, if x belongs simultaneously to the interiors of
the domains specified by (30) and (33) (that is, with solutions in cases (iii) and (iv)
simultaneously), then necessarily x ∈ D2 (that is, for x ∈ D1 the conditions specifying
cases (iii) and (iv) are incompatible).
Denoting κ = kD/ki, we can summarize the properties of HJB equation (11) as follows
(uniqueness is always understood up to the shifts in g).
Proposition 3.1. Suppose x ∈ D1.
(1) If
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec + λ)(α + q
D
rec)
< κ <
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (36)
then there exists a unique solution to (11) belonging to case (iii) and there are no other
solutions to (11).
(2) If
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec + λ)(α + q
D
rec)
< κ <
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (37)
then there exists a unique solution to (11) belonging to case (iv) and there are no other
solutions to (11).
(3) A solution belonging to case (i) exists if and only if
κ ≥
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (38)
and is unique if this holds. A solution belonging to case (ii) exists if and only if
κ ≤
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec + λ)(α + q
D
rec)
, (39)
and is unique if this holds. Either of conditions (38) or (39) is incompatible with either
(36) or (37). In particular, equation (11) may have at most two solutions (if both (38)
and (39) hold).
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(4) Under (16), one has always
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec + λ)(α + q
D
rec)
≥
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (40)
and
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec + λ)(α + q
D
rec)
≤
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
. (41)
Hence (37) becomes impossible and conditions (38) and (39) become incompatible implying
the uniqueness of the solution to (11) for any x ∈ D1. This unique solution belongs to
cases (ii), (iii) and (i) respectively for κ satisfying (39), (36), (38) (when equality holds
in (38) or (39), two solutions from different cases become coinciding).
Proof. Statements (1)-(3) follow from the arguments given above. (iv) Under (16), con-
ditions (41) and (40) rewrite as
qrec(β − α)
2 − (β − α)(β + λ + qrec)(α + qrec) ≤ 0
and
qrec(β − α)
2 + (β − α)(β + qrec)(α+ λ+ qrec) ≥ 0,
which obviously hold.
Remark 2. (1) When (16) does not hold one can find situations when solutions from
cases (i) and (ii) exist simultaneously. To get simple examples one can assume κ = 1.
(2) When two solutions exist simultaneously one can discriminate them by the values of
the average payoff µ. One sees from (20) and (25), that µ arising from cases (i) and (ii)
are different (apart from a single value of κ). (3) The uniqueness result under (16) is
quite remarkable, as it does not seem to follow a priori from any intuitive arguments.
Again directly from the argument above one can conclude the following.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose x ∈ D2.
(1) If
κ >
(β + λ)qDrec − (α+ λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (42)
then there exists a unique solution to (11) belonging to case (i) and there are no other
solutions to (11).
(2) If
κ <
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec + λ)(α + q
D
rec)
, (43)
then there exists a unique solution to (11) belonging to case (ii) and there are no other
solutions to (11).
(3) A solution belonging to case (iii) exists if and only if
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec + λ)(α+ q
D
rec)
≤ κ ≤
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (44)
and is unique if this holds. A solution belonging to case (iv) exists if and only if
β(λ+ qDrec)− α(λ+ q
U
rec)
(β + qUrec + λ)(α+ q
D
rec)
≤ κ ≤
(β + λ)qDrec − (α + λ)q
U
rec
(β + qUrec)(α + q
D
rec + λ)
, (45)
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and is unique if this holds. Either of conditions (44) or (45) is incompatible with either
(42) or (43). In particular, equation (11) may have at most two solutions (if (44) and
(45) hold simultaneously).
Essential simplifications that allow eventually for a full classification of the stationary
MFG consistency problem occur in the limit of large λ. For a precise formulation in case
δ = qDrec − q
U
rec > 0 (46)
one needs further decomposition of the domains D1, D2. Namely, for j = 1, 2, let
Dj1 = {x ∈ Dj :
δ
α + qDrec
<
β − α
β + qUrec
}.
Proposition 3.3. The following hold for large λ outside an interval of κ of size of order
λ−1:
(1) Under (16) conditions (39), (36), (38) classifying the solutions to the HJB equation
rewrite as
κ ≤ 0, 0 < κ <
(β − α)
β + q
, κ ≥
(β − α)
β + q
, (47)
respectively. In particular, solutions of case (ii) become impossible.
(2) Suppose x ∈ D1 and (46) holds. If x ∈ D11, there exists a unique solution to (11),
which belongs to cases (ii), (iii), (i) for
κ <
δ
α + qDrec
,
δ
α + qDrec
< κ <
β − α
β + qUrec
, κ >
β − α
β + qUrec
, (48)
respectively. If x ∈ D12, solutions from case (iii) do not exist and there exist two solutions
to (11) for
β − α
β + qUrec
< κ <
δ
α + qDrec
, (49)
belonging to cases (i) and (ii), and only one solution otherwise.
(3) Suppose x ∈ D2. If x ∈ D22, solutions from case (iii) do not exist and there is
always a unique solution to (11) belonging to case (ii), (iv) or (i), for
κ <
β − α
α + qDrec
,
β − α
α + qDrec
< κ <
δ
β + qUrec
, κ >
δ
β + qUrec
, (50)
respectively. If x ∈ D21, then there are two solutions to (11) for
δ
α + qDrec
< κ <
β − α
β + qUrec
, (51)
which belong to cases (iii) and (iv), and one solution otherwise. This unique solution
belongs to case (ii) or (i) for
κ <
β − α
α+ qDrec
, κ >
δ
β + qUrec
respectively and to case (iv) otherwise.
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Proof. Statement (ii) follows from the observation that, for δ > 0 and large λ, conditions
(36) - (37) turn to
δ
α+ qDrec
< κ <
β − α
β + qUrec
,
β − α
α + qDrec
< κ <
δ
β + qUrec
(52)
respectively, and conditions (38) - (39) turn to
κ ≥
β − α
β + qUrec
, κ ≤
δ
α + qDrec
(53)
respectively. Other statements are similar.
4 Analysis of the fixed points
Next we are solving the fixed point system (12).
In case (i), that is with uUI = uUS = 0, uDI = uDS = 1, equation (12) takes the form

xDSα− xDIq
D
rec − λxDI = 0
− xDSα + xDIq
D
rec − λxDS = 0
xUSβ − xUIq
U
rec + λxDI = 0
− xUSβ + xUIq
U
rec + λxDS = 0.
(54)
Adding the first two equations we get xDI = xDS = 0, and the system reduces to the
single equation
xUSβ − xUIq
U
rec = 0.
Substituting the value of β yields
xUS(q
U
infvH + xUIβUU)− xUIq
U
rec = 0.
Denoting y = xUI it follows that xUS = 1− y and thus
QU(y) = βUUy
2 + y(qUrec − βUU + q
U
infvH)− q
U
infvH = 0.
This equation has a unique solution on the interval (0, 1):
x∗ = x∗UI =
1
2βUU
[
βUU − q
U
rec − q
U
infvH +
√
(βUU + qUinfvH)
2 + (qUrec)
2 − 2qUrec(βUU − q
U
infvH)
]
.
(55)
The stability of the fixed point x = (0, 0, x∗, 1−x∗) means its stability as a fixed point
of the dynamics 

x˙DI = xDSα− xDIq
D
rec − λxDI
x˙DS = −xDSα + xDIq
D
rec − λxDS
x˙UI = xUSβ − xUIq
U
rec + λxDI
x˙US = −xUSβ + xUIq
U
rec + λxDS.
(56)
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We rewrite it by shifting the variables by the value of the stationary point, that is, in
terms of xDI , xDS, y = xUI − x
∗, z = xUS − (1 − x
∗). Since the sum of these variables is
one, we have effectively the system of three equations on the variables xDI , xDS, y:

x˙DI = [q
D
infvH + xDIβDD + (x
∗ + y)βUD]xDS − (λ+ q
D
rec)xDI
x˙DS = −[q
D
infvH + xDIβDD + (x
∗ + y)βUD]xDS + q
D
recxDI − λxDS
y˙ = (1− x∗ − y − xDI − xDS)[q
U
infvH + βDUxDI + βUU(y + x
∗)]− (y + x∗)qUrec + λxDS.
Its linear approximation around the fixed point (0, 0, 0) is

x˙DI = −(λ + q
D
rec)xDI + (q
D
infvH + x
∗βUD)xDS
x˙DS = q
D
recxDI − (q
D
infvH + x
∗βUD + λ)xDS
y˙ = (1− x∗)[βDUxDI + βUUy]− (y + xDI + xDS)(q
U
infvH + x
∗βUU)− q
U
recy + λxDS,
and the corresponding characteristic equation for the eigenvalues ξ is
[(1− x∗)βUU − (q
U
infvH + x
∗βUU)− q
U
rec − ξ]
×[(ξ + λ+ qUinfvH + x
∗βUU)(ξ + λ+ q
D
rec)− q
D
rec(q
U
infvH + x
∗βUU)] = 0.
The free term cancels in the second multiplier and we get the eigenvalues

ξ1 = (1− x
∗)βUU − q
U
infvH − x
∗βUU − q
U
rec
ξ2 = −λ− (q
D
rec + q
U
infvH + x
∗βUU)
ξ3 = −λ.
(57)
The second and the third eigenvalues being negative, the condition of stability is reduced
to the negativity of the first eigenvalue, that is, to the condition
2x∗ > 1−
qUrec + q
U
infvH
βUU
. (58)
But it always holds for x∗ of form (55).
Thus we proved the first part of the following statement and the second is analogous.
Proposition 4.1. (1) There exists a unique solution to system (12) with the strategy U
being individually optimal (that is, with the first acyclic stationary strategy uUI = uUS =
0, uDI = uDS = 1) and it is stable. It equals x = (0, 0, x
∗
UI , 1 − x
∗
UI) with x
∗
UI given by
(55).
(2) There exists a unique solution to system (12) with the strategy D being individually
optimal (that is, with the second acyclic stationary strategy) and it is stable. It equals
x = (x∗DI , 1− x
∗
DI , 0, 0) with x
∗
DI being the unique solution of equation
QD(y) = βDDy
2 + y(qDrec − βDD + q
D
infvH)− q
D
infvH = 0 (59)
on the interval (0, 1), that is
x∗DI =
1
2βDD
[
βDD − q
D
rec − q
D
infvH +
√
(βDD + q
D
infvH)
2 + (qDrec)
2 − 2qDrec(βDD − q
D
infvH)
]
.
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Let us consider case (iii): uUI = uDS = 0, uDI = uUS = 1. Then (12) takes the form

xDSα− xDIq
D
rec − λxDI = 0
− xDSα + xDIq
D
rec + λxUS = 0
xUSβ − xUIq
U
rec + λxDI = 0
− xUSβ + xUIq
U
rec − λxUS = 0.
(60)
By adding the first two equations we get xDI = xUS with two independent equations
left: {
xDSα− (q
D
rec + λ)xDI = 0
xDI(β + λ)− xUIq
U
rec = 0.
(61)
This rewrites as two equations on the two independent variables xDI , xUI as{
(1− xUI − 2xDI)(q
D
infvH + βDDxDI + βUDxUI)− (q
D
rec + λ)xDI = 0
xDI(q
U
infvH + βDUxDI + βUUxUI + λ)− xUIq
U
rec = 0.
(62)
Solving the second equation with respect to xUI ,
xUI =
xDI(q
U
infvH + xDIβDU + λ)
qUrec − βUUxDI
, (63)
and substituting in the first one, leads to a fourth order equation on y = xDI . This
equation does not seem to be much revealing in general. Of course it can be fully analyzed
by numeric methods, but we shall turn now to the large λ asymptotics that yields more
manageable results.
For large λ we get directly from (63) that
xUI =
xDIλ
qUrec − βUUxDI
(1 +O(λ−1)).
But this implies that xDI is small of order O(λ
−1), so that
xUI =
xDIλ
qUrec
(1 +O(λ−1)), xDI =
xUIq
U
rec
λ
(1 +O(λ−1)). (64)
Substituting this in the first equation of (62) yields
βUDx
2
UI + xUI(q
U
rec − βUD + q
D
infvH)− q
D
infvH = O(λ
−1), (65)
which is of the same type as equations (59) up to terms of order λ−1 (and coincides with
it under (15), (16)). Therefore, for large λ, there exists a unique solution to (65) from the
interval (0, 1):
x¯∗UI = O(λ
−1)
+
1
2βUD
[
βUD − q
U
rec − q
D
infvH +
√
(βUD + q
D
infvH)
2 + (qUrec)
2 − 2qUrec(βUD − q
D
infvH)
]
.
(66)
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The stability of the fixed point x = (x∗DI , x
∗
DS = 1 − x¯
∗
UI − 2x
∗
DI , x¯
∗
UI , x
∗
US = x
∗
DI)
means its stability as a fixed point of the dynamics

x˙DI = xDSα− xDIq
D
rec − λxDI
x˙DS = −xDSα + xDIq
D
rec + λxUS
x˙UI = xUSβ − xUIq
U
rec + λxDI
x˙US = −xUSβ + xUIq
U
rec − λxUS.
(67)
In terms of independent variables
x˜DI = xDI − x
∗
DI , x˜US = xUS − x
∗
US, y = x˜UI = xUI − x¯
∗
UI
this rewrites as

d
dt
x˜DI = (1− y − x¯
∗
UI − x˜DI − x˜US)α− x˜DIq
D
rec − λ(x˜DI + x
∗
DI) +O(λ
−1)
y˙ = x˜USβ − (y + x¯
∗
UI)q
U
rec + λ(x˜DI + x
∗
DI) +O(λ
−1)
d
dt
x˜US = −x˜USβ + (y + x¯
∗
UI)q
U
rec − λ(x˜US + x
∗
US) +O(λ
−1).
(68)
with
α = qDinfvH + x˜DIβDD + (y + x¯
∗
UI)βUD +O(λ
−1),
β = qUinfvH + x˜DIβDU + (y + x¯
∗
UI)βUU +O(λ
−1).
Linearized around the fixed point (0, 0, 0) system (68) takes the form

d
dt
x˜DI = −(y + x˜DI + x˜US)(q
D
infvH + x¯
∗
UIβUD) + (1− x¯
∗
UI)(x˜DIβDD + x˜UIβUD)− x˜DI(q
D
rec + λ)
y˙ = x˜US(q
U
infvH + x¯
∗
UIβUU)− x˜UIq
U
rec + λx˜DI
d
dt
x˜US = −x˜US(q
U
infvH + x¯
∗
UIβUU) + x˜UIq
U
rec − λx˜US
up to terms of order O(λ−1). Thus the matrix of the linear approximation divided by λ
is
M(λ) =


O(λ−1)− 1 [−qDrecvH + βUD(1− 2x¯
∗
UI)]/λ+O(λ
−2) O(λ−1)
O(λ−1) + 1 − qUrec/λ+O(λ
−2) O(λ−1)
O(λ−1) O(λ−1) O(λ−1)− 1

 .
The first order approximation of this matrix in λ−1 is
M0 =


− 1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 − 1

 .
and has eigenvalue −1 of double multiplicity and a zero eigenvalue. Hence all eigenvalues
ofM(λ) are negative if and only if its determinant det(M(λ)) is negative. As seen directly
det(M(λ)) = [−qUrec − q
D
recvH + βUD(1− 2x¯
∗
UI)]/λ+O(λ
−2),
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and is negative for large λ if and only if
βUD(2x¯
∗
UI − 1) > q
U
rec + q
D
recvH ,
which always holds by (66). Thus we proved the first part of the following statement and
the second part is analogous.
Proposition 4.2. (1) For large λ there exists a unique solution to system (12) in case
(iii), that is with uUI = uDS = 0, uDI = uUS = 1, and it is stable. It has the form
x = (0, 1− x¯∗UI , x¯
∗
UI , 0) up to corrections of order λ
−1, with x¯∗UI being the unique solution
of equation (65) on (0, 1) given by (66).
(2) For large λ there exists a unique solution to system (12) in case (iv), that is with
uUI = uDS = 1, uDI = uUS = 0, and it is stable. It has the form x = (x¯
∗
DI , 0, 0, 1− x¯
∗
UI)
up to corrections of order λ−1, with x¯∗DI being the unique solution of equation
βDUx
2
DI + xDI(q
U
rec − βDU + q
U
infvH)− q
U
infvH = O(λ
−1), (69)
on (0, 1).
5 Solutions to the stationary MFG problem
Combining Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 3.3 allows one to fully characterize the solutions to
our stationary MFG consistency problem for large λ.
The most straightforward general conclusion is the following.
Theorem 5.1. For large λ there may exist up to 4 solutions to the stationary MFG
problem, with only one in each of the cases (i) -(iv). All these solutions are stable.
Remark 3. Notice that already this statement is not at all obvious a priori, and may not
be true for finite λ, where solutions to case (iii) or (iv) are found from an equation of
fourth order.
As an example of more precise classification, let us present it under assumption (17)
that ensures that all solutions lie in the domain D1.
Let us introduce the function
κ(z) =
(qUinf − q
D
inf )vH + z(βUU − βUD)
qUinfvH + zβUU + q
.
First let (16) hold. It is seen from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 that for large λ, (and apart
from κ from negligible intervals of size of order λ−1 that we shall ignore), a solution of
the stationary MFG problem exists in case (i) if
κ > κ∗ = κ(x∗UI),
and a solution of the stationary MFG problem exists in case (iii) if
κ < κ¯∗ = κ(x¯∗UI),
where x∗UI and x¯
∗
UI are given by (55) and (66) respectively. Thus one can have up to
two (automatically stable) solutions to the stationary MFG problem. Let us make this
number precise.
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Differentiating κ(z) we find directly that it is increasing if
βUU(q
D
infvH + q) > βUD(q
U
infvH + q), (70)
and decreasing otherwise. Hence the relation κ∗ > κ¯∗ is equivalent to the same or the
opposite relation for x∗UI and x¯
∗
UI . Thus we are led to the following conclusion.
Theorem 5.2. Let (16) hold.
(1) If (70) holds and x∗UI > x¯
∗
UI , or the opposite to (70) holds and x
∗
UI < x¯
∗
UI , then
κ
∗ > κ¯∗. Consequently, for κ < κ¯∗ there exists a unique solution to the stationary MFG
problem, which is stable and belongs to case (iii); for κ ∈ (κ¯∗,κ∗) there are no solutions
to the stationary MFG problem; for κ > κ∗ there exists a unique solution to the stationary
MFG problem, which is stable and belongs to case (i).
(2) If (70) holds and x∗UI < x¯
∗
UI , or the opposite to (70) holds and x
∗
UI > x¯
∗
UI , then
κ
∗ < κ¯∗. Consequently, for κ < κ∗ there exists a unique solution to the stationary MFG
problem, which is stable and belongs to case (iii); for κ ∈ (κ∗, κ¯∗) there exist two (stable)
solutions to the stationary MFG problem; for κ > κ¯∗ there exists a unique solution to the
stationary MFG problem, which is stable and belongs to case (i).
Thus if one considers the system for all parameters fixed except for κ (essentially
specifying the price of the defence service), points κ∗ and κ¯∗ are the bifurcation points,
where the phase transitions occur.
To deal with case when (16) does not hold let us introduce the numbers
κ1 =
β − α
β + qUrec
(x∗UI), κ2 =
δ
α + qDrec
(x∗DI), κ3 =
δ
α + qDrec
(x¯∗UI), κ4 =
β − α
β + qUrec
(x¯∗UI),
where x∗UI , x
∗
DI , x¯
∗
UI in brackets mean that α, β defined in (10) are evaluated at the corre-
sponding solutions given by Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. Since x∗UI , x
∗
DI , x¯
∗
UI are expressed in
terms of different parameters, any order relation between them are to be expected in gen-
eral. Of course, restrictions appear under additional assumptions, for instance x∗DI = x¯
∗
UI
under (15). From Proposition 3.3 we deduce the following.
Theorem 5.3. Let (17) and (46) hold.
Depending on the order relation between x∗UI , x
∗
DI , x¯
∗
UI , one can have up to 3 solutions
to the stationary MFG problem for large λ, the characterization in each case being fully
explicit, since for κ > κ1, there exists a unique solution in case (i), for κ < κ2, there
exists a unique solution in case (ii), for κ3 < κ < κ4, there exists a unique solution in
case (iii).
Thus in this case the points κ1,κ2,κ3,κ4 are the bifurcation points, where the phase
transitions occur.
The situation when (17) does not hold is analogous, though there appears an additional
bifurcation relating to x crossing the border between D1 and D2, and the possibility of
having four solutions arises.
6 Discussion
Our model of four basic states is of course the simplest one that takes effective account
of both interaction (infection) and rational decision making. It suggests extensions in
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various directions. For instance, it is practically important to allow for the choice of
various competing protection systems, leading to a model with 2d basic states: iI and iS,
where i ∈ {1, · · · , d} denotes the ith defense system available (which can be alternatively
interpreted as the levels of protection provided by a single or different firms), while S
and I denote again susceptible or infected state, with all other parameters depending
on i. On the other hand, in the spirit of papers [18], [17] that concentrate on modeling
myopic behavior (rather than rational optimization) of players one can consider the set of
computer owners consisting of two groups, rational optimizers and those changing their
strategies by copying their neighbors.
The main theoretical question arising from our results concerns the rigorous relation
between stationary and dynamic MFG solutions, which in general is in front of research
in the mean-field game literature. We hope that working with our simple model with fully
solved stationary version can help to get new insights in this direction. In the present
context the question can be formulated as follows. Suppose that, if at some moment of
time N players are distributed according certain frequency vector x among the four basic
state, each player chooses the optimal strategy u arising from the solution of the stationary
problem for fixed x (fully described in Section 3), and the Markov evolution continues
according to the generator L. When two solutions are available, players may be supposed
to choose the one with the lowest µ (see see Remark 2 (2)). The resulting changes in x
induce the corresponding changes of u specifying a well-defined Markov process on the
states of N agents. Intuitively, we would expect this evolution stay near our stationary
MFG solutions for large N and t. Can one prove something like that?
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